Reading: Battle of Stalingrad – Wikipedia
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to 18 November 1942 Case Blue : german advances from 7 May 1942 to 18 November 1942 In the Battle of Stalingrad ( 23 August 1942 – 2 February 1943 ), [ 18 ] [ 19 ] Germany and its allies fought the Soviet Union for see of the city of Stalingrad ( now Volgograd ) in southern Russia. Marked by cutthroat close-quarters battle and direct assaults on civilians in publicize raids, it is one of the bloodiest battles in the history of war, with an estimated 2 million total casualties. [ 20 ] After their kill at Stalingrad, the german High Command had to withdraw considerable military forces from early theaters of war to replace their losses. [ 21 ] The german offensive to capture Stalingrad—a major industrial and transmit hub on the Volga River that ensured soviet access to the Caucasus oil wells—began in August 1942, using the 6th Army and elements of the fourth Panzer Army. The attack was supported by acute Luftwaffe bombing that reduced much of the city to rubble. The battle degenerated into door-to-door contend as both sides poured reinforcements into the city. By mid-november, the Germans, at bang-up monetary value, had pushed the soviet defenders back into narrow zones along the west bank of the river. On 19 November, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a two-pronged attack targeting the weak romanian armies protecting the 6th Army ‘s flanks. The Axis flanks were overrun and the 6th Army was cut off and surrounded in the Stalingrad area. Adolf Hitler was determined to hold the city at all costs and forbade the 6th Army from attempting a break ; rather, attempts were made to supply it by air and to break the blockade from the outside. Heavy fighting continued for another two months. At the begin of February 1943, the Axis forces in Stalingrad, having exhausted their ammunition and food, surrendered after five months, one workweek, and three days of contend .
background
By the jump of 1942, despite the failure of Operation Barbarossa to decisively defeat the Soviet Union in a unmarried campaign, the Wehrmacht had captured huge expanses of territory, including Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic republics. elsewhere, the war had been progressing well : the U-boat unsavory in the Atlantic had been very successful and Erwin Rommel had barely captured Tobruk. [ 24 ] : 522 In the east, the Germans had stabilised a movement running from Leningrad south to Rostov, with a count of child salients. Hitler was confident that he could break the Red Army despite the heavy german losses west of Moscow in winter 1941–42, because Army Group Centre ( Heeresgruppe Mitte ) had been ineffective to engage 65 % of its infantry, which had meanwhile been rested and re-equipped. Neither Army Group North nor Army Group South had been particularly distressed over the winter. Stalin was expecting the chief lunge of the german summer attacks to be directed against Moscow again. [ 21 ] : 498 With the initial operations being identical successful, the Germans decided that their summer crusade in 1942 would be directed at the southern parts of the Soviet Union. The initial objectives in the region around Stalingrad were to destroy the industrial capacity of the city and to block the Volga River traffic connecting the Caucasus and Caspian Sea to cardinal Russia. The Germans cut the grapevine from the oilfields when they captured Rostov on 23 July. The capture of Stalingrad would make the manner of speaking of Lend Lease supplies via the Persian Corridor much more difficult. On 23 July 1942, Hitler personally rewrote the operational objectives for the 1942 campaign, greatly expanding them to include the occupation of the city of Stalingrad. Both sides began to attach propaganda value to the city, which bore the name of the soviet drawing card. Hitler proclaimed that after Stalingrad ‘s get, its male citizens were to be killed and all women and children were to be deported because its population was “ thoroughly communist ” and “ particularly dangerous ”. [ 29 ] It was assumed that the descend of the city would besides hard secure the northern and western flanks of the german armies as they advanced on Baku, with the aim of securing its strategic petroleum resources for Germany. [ 24 ] : 528 The expansion of objectives was a significant factor in Germany ‘s failure at Stalingrad, caused by german certitude and an underestimate of soviet reserves. [ 30 ] The Soviets realised their critical site, ordering everyone who could hold a plunder into the competitiveness. [ 31 ] : 94
prelude
If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must finish [ liquidieren ; “ kill off ”, “ liquidate ” ] this war .Adolf Hitler[24] : 514
Army Group South was selected for a sprint forward through the southerly russian steppes into the Caucasus to capture the critical soviet petroleum fields there. The aforethought summer unsavory, code-named Fall Blau ( Case Blue ), was to include the german 6th, 17th, 4th Panzer and 1st Panzer Armies. Army Group South had overrun the ukrainian soviet Socialist Republic in 1941. Poised in Eastern Ukraine, it was to spearhead the nauseating. [ 32 ] Hitler intervened, however, ordering the Army Group to split in two. Army Group South ( A ), under the control of Wilhelm List, was to continue advancing south towards the Caucasus as planned with the seventeenth Army and First Panzer Army. Army Group South ( B ), including Friedrich Paulus ‘s 6th Army and Hermann Hoth ‘s 4th Panzer Army, was to move east towards the Volga and Stalingrad. Army Group B was commanded by General Maximilian von Weichs .
The german advance to the Don River between 7 May and 23 July The start of Case Blue had been planned for late May 1942. however, a number of german and romanian units that were to take region in Blau were besieging Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. Delays in ending the siege pushed back the startle date for Blau several times, and the city did not fall until early on July. Operation Fridericus I by the Germans against the “ Isium bulge ”, pinched off the soviet outstanding in the moment Battle of Kharkov, and resulted in the enclosure of a large soviet force between 17 May and 29 May. similarly, Operation Wilhelm attacked Voltshansk on 13 June, and Operation Fridericus attacked Kupiansk on 22 June. Blau last opened as Army Group South began its attack into southerly Russia on 28 June 1942. The german dysphemistic started well. soviet forces offered little resistance in the huge empty steppes and started streaming east. several attempts to re-establish a defensive line failed when german units outflanked them. Two major pockets were formed and destroyed : the first, northeast of Kharkov, on 2 July, and a second base, around Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, a workweek subsequently. meanwhile, the hungarian 2nd Army and the german 4th Panzer Army had launched an assault on Voronezh, capturing the city on 5 July. The initial promote of the 6th Army was so successful that Hitler intervened and ordered the 4th Panzer Army to join Army Group South ( A ) to the south. A massive traffic crush resulted when the 4th Panzer and the 1st Panzer choked the roads, stopping both dead while they cleared the fix of thousands of vehicles. The stay is thought to have delayed the advance at least one week. With the advance nowadays slowed, Hitler changed his judgment and reassigned the 4th Panzer Army bet on to the attack on Stalingrad. By the end of July, the Germans had pushed the Soviets across the Don River. At this point, the Don and Volga Rivers are entirely 65 km ( 40 mile ) apart, and the Germans left their chief supply terminal west of the Don, which had important implications later in the course of the struggle. The Germans began using the armies of their italian, hungarian and romanian allies to guard their leave ( northerly ) flank. occasionally italian actions were mentioned in official german communiques. [ 35 ] [ 36 ] [ 37 ] [ 38 ] italian forces were generally held in little involve by the Germans, and were accused of depleted morale : in reality, the italian divisions fought relatively well, with the 3rd Mountain Infantry Division Ravenna and 5th Infantry Division Cosseria showing emotional state, according to a german affair military officer. [ 39 ] The Italians were forced to retreat only after a massive armored attack in which german reinforcements failed to arrive in time, according to german historian Rolf-Dieter Müller .
On 25 July the Germans faced firm resistance with a soviet bridgehead west of Kalach. “ We had had to pay a high cost in men and material … left on the Kalach battlefield were numerous burned or shot-up german tanks. ” The Germans formed bridgeheads across the Don on 20 August, with the 295th and 76th Infantry Divisions enabling the XIVth Panzer Corps “ to thrust to the Volga union of Stalingrad. ” The german 6th Army was only a few twelve kilometres from Stalingrad. The fourth Panzer Army, ordered south on 13 July to block the Soviet retrograde “ weakened by the seventeenth Army and the 1st Panzer Army ”, had turned northwards to help take the city from the confederacy. To the south, Army Group A was pushing far into the Caucasus, but their advance slowed as provide lines grew overextended. The two german army groups were besides far apart to support one another. After german intentions became gain in July 1942, Stalin appointed General Andrey Yeryomenko air force officer of the Southeastern Front on 1 August 1942. Yeryomenko and Commissar Nikita Khrushchev were tasked with planning the defense of Stalingrad. Beyond the Volga River on the easterly limit of Stalingrad, extra soviet units were formed into the 62nd Army under Lieutenant General Vasiliy Chuikov on 11 September 1942. Tasked with holding the city at all costs, Chuikov proclaimed, “ We will defend the city or die in the try. ” The battle earned him one of his two Hero of the Soviet Union awards .
Orders of battle
red Army
During the defense of Stalingrad, the Red Army deployed five armies in and around the city ( 28th, 51st, 57th, 62nd and 64th Armies ) ; and an extra nine armies in the blockade counteroffensive ( 24th, 65th, 66th Armies and 16th Air Army from the north as part of the Don Front unsavory, and 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank, 21st Army, 2nd Air Army and 17th Air Army from the south as separate of the Southwestern Front ) .
axis
attack on Stalingrad
initial attack
The german advance to Stalingrad between 24 July and 18 November “ Stalingrad-South ”, 1942 map from the german General Staff David Glantz indicated [ 47 ] that four hard-fought battles – jointly known as the Kotluban Operations – north of Stalingrad, where the Soviets made their greatest stand, decided Germany ‘s fortune before the Nazis ever set foot in the city itself, and were a turning point in the war. Beginning in late August, continuing in September and into October, the Soviets committed between two and four armies in hurriedly coordinated and ill controlled attacks against the Germans ‘ northerly flank. The actions resulted in more than 200,000 soviet Army casualties but did slow the german assail. On 23 August the 6th Army reached the outskirts of Stalingrad in pursuit of the 62nd and 64th Armies, which had fallen back into the city. Kleist late said after the war :
The capture of Stalingrad was auxiliary to the main aim. It was only of importance as a commodious place, in the bottleneck between Don and the Volga, where we could block an attack on our flank by russian forces coming from the east. At the begin, Stalingrad was no more than a name on the map to us .
The Soviets had enough warning of the german progress to ship grain, cattle, and railway cars across the Volga out of harm ‘s way, but Stalin refused to evacuate the 400,000 civilian residents of Stalingrad. This “ harvest victory ” left the city short of food even before the german attack began. Before the Heer reached the city itself, the Luftwaffe had cut off shipping on the Volga, vital for bringing supplies into the city. Between 25 and 31 July, 32 soviet ships were sunk, with another nine crippled .
smoke over the city center after aerial bombing by the german Luftwaffe on the central station german infantry in place for an attack. The battle began with the heavy bombing of the city by Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen ‘s Luftflotte 4. Some 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 48 hours, more than in London at the stature of the Blitz. The claim number of civilians killed is unknown but was most probably very high. Around 40,000 civilians were taken to Germany as slave workers, some fled during battle and a modest issue were evacuated by the Soviets, but by February 1943 lone 10,000 to 60,000 civilians were placid animated. much of the city was smashed to rubble, although some factories continued production while workers joined in the fight. The Stalingrad Tractor Factory continued to turn out T-34 tanks up until german troops fusillade into the implant. The 369th ( croatian ) Reinforced Infantry Regiment was the entirely non-German unit [ 51 ] selected by the Wehrmacht to enter Stalingrad city during assault operations. It fought as part of the hundredth Jäger Division. Stalin rushed all available troops to the east bank of the Volga, some from as far away as Siberia. Regular river ferries were promptly destroyed by the Luftwaffe, which then targeted parade barges being towed lento across by tug. It has been said that Stalin prevented civilians from leaving the city in the impression that their presence would encourage greater resistance from the city ‘s defenders. Civilians, including women and children, were put to work build up trenchworks and protective fortifications. A massive German air raid on 23 August caused a firestorm, killing hundreds and turning Stalingrad into a huge landscape of debris and sunburn ruins. Ninety percentage of the be space in the Voroshilovskiy area was destroyed. between 23 and 26 August, soviet reports indicate 955 people were killed and another 1,181 wounded as a result of the bombard. Casualties of 40,000 were greatly exaggerated, and after 25 August the Soviets did not record any civilian and military casualties as a resultant role of air travel raids. [ note 3 ]
Soviets preparing to ward off a german rape in Stalingrad ‘s suburb The Soviet Air Force, the Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily ( VVS ), was swept away by the Luftwaffe. The VVS bases in the contiguous sphere lost 201 aircraft between 23 and 31 August, and despite meager reinforcements of some 100 aircraft in August, it was left with equitable 192 serviceable aircraft, 57 of which were fighters. The Soviets continued to pour antenna reinforcements into the Stalingrad area in former September, but continued to suffer dismay losses ; the Luftwaffe had arrant control of the skies. The charge of the initial defense of the city fell on the 1077th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, a unit of measurement made up chiefly of young female volunteers who had no trail for engaging ground targets. Despite this, and with no documentation available from other units, the AA gunners stayed at their posts and took on the advancing panzers. The german 16th Panzer Division reportedly had to fight the 1077th ‘s gunners “ shoot for shoot ” until all 37 anti-aircraft guns were destroyed or overrun. The 16th Panzer was shocked to find that, ascribable to soviet work force shortages, it had been fighting female soldiers. [ 57 ] In the early stages of the struggle, the NKVD organised ailing armed “ Workers ‘ militia “ exchangeable to those that had defended the city twenty-four years earlier, composed of civilians not directly involved in war production for immediate use in the battle. The civilians were frequently sent into battle without rifles. Staff and students from the local technical university formed a “ tank destroyer ” unit. They assembled tanks from leftover parts at the tractor factory. These tanks, unpainted and lacking gun-sights, were driven directly from the factory floor to the front course. They could entirely be aimed at point-blank range through the bore of their gun barrels .
german soldiers clearing the streets in Stalingrad By the end of August, Army Group South ( B ) had ultimately reached the Volga, north of Stalingrad. Another gain to the river south of the city followed, while the Soviets abandoned their Rossoshka situation for the inner defensive ring west of Stalingrad. The wings of the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army met near Jablotchni along the Zaritza on 2 Sept. By 1 September, the Soviets could entirely reinforce and supply their forces in Stalingrad by parlous crossings of the Volga under ceaseless bombardment by artillery and aircraft .
September city battles
On 5 September, the soviet 24th and 66th Armies organized a massive fire against XIV Panzer Corps. The Luftwaffe helped repel the offensive by heavily attacking soviet weapon positions and defensive lines. The Soviets were forced to withdraw at noon after lone a few hours. Of the 120 tanks the Soviets had committed, 30 were lost to air attack .
soviet soldiers running through trenches in the ruins of Stalingrad soviet operations were constantly hampered by the Luftwaffe. On 18 September, the soviet 1st Guards and 24th Army launched an nauseating against VIII Army Corps at Kotluban. VIII. Fliegerkorps dispatch wave after wave of Stuka dive-bombers to prevent a discovery. The offensive was repelled. The Stukas claimed 41 of the 106 soviet tanks knocked out that dawn, while escorting Bf 109s destroyed 77 soviet aircraft. Amid the debris of the bust up city, the soviet 62nd and 64th Armies, which included the soviet thirteenth Guards Rifle Division, anchored their defense lines with strong-points in houses and factories. Fighting within the ruin city was boisterous and despairing. lieutenant General Alexander Rodimtsev was in charge of the thirteenth Guards Rifle Division, and received one of two Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded during the battle for his actions. Stalin ‘s Order No. 227 of 27 July 1942 appointed that all commanders who ordered unauthorized retreats would be subject to a military court. [ 63 ] Deserters and perceived malingerers were captured or executed after fighting. [ 64 ] During the battle the 62nd Army had the most arrests and executions : 203 in all, of which 49 were executed, while 139 were sent to penal companies and battalions. [ 65 ] [ 66 ] [ 67 ] [ 68 ] The Germans pushing advancing into Stalingrad suffered heavy casualties. By 12 September, at the clock time of their retreat into the city, the soviet 62nd army had been reduced to 90 tanks, 700 mortars and fair 20,000 personnel. The remaining tanks were used as immobile strong-points within the city. The initial german attack on 14 September attempted to take the city in a rush. The 51st Army Corps ‘ 295th Infantry Division went after the Mamayev Kurgan mound, the 71st attacked the cardinal rail station and toward the cardinal landing stage on the Volga, while 48th Panzer Corps attacked south of the Tsaritsa River. Rodimtsev ‘s 13th Guards Rifle Division had been hurried up to cross the river and join the defenders inside the city. Assigned to counterattack at the Mamayev Kurgan and at Railway Station No. 1, it suffered particularly intemperate losses .
Though initially successful, the german attacks stalled in the boldness of soviet reinforcements brought in from across the Volga. The soviet thirteenth Guards Rifle Division, assigned to counterattack at the Mamayev Kurgan and at Railway Station No. 1, suffered particularly heavy losses. Over 30 percentage of its soldiers were killed in the first 24 hours, and merely 320 out of the master 10,000 survived the stallion battle. Both objectives were retaken, but alone temporarily. The railway station changed hands 14 times in six hours. By the following flush, the 13th Guards Rifle Division had ceased to exist. Combat raged for three days at the elephantine grain elevator in the south of the city. About fifty Red Army defenders, cut off from resupply, held the position for five days and fought off ten unlike assaults before running out of ammunition and water. only forty dead soviet fighters were found, though the Germans had thought there were many more due to the saturation of immunity. The Soviets burned large amounts of grain during their retreat in ordain to deny the enemy food. Paulus chose the texture elevator and silo as the symbol of Stalingrad for a bandage he was having designed to commemorate the conflict after a german victory .
german soldiers of the 24th Panzer Division in legal action during the fight for the southerly station of Stalingrad. In another depart of the city, a soviet platoon under the dominate of Sergeant Yakov Pavlov fortified a four-story construction that oversaw a square 300 meters from the river savings bank, subsequently called Pavlov’s House. The soldiers surrounded it with minefields, set up machine-gun positions at the windows and breached the walls in the basement for better communications. The soldiers found about ten soviet civilians hiding in the basement. They were not relieved, and not significantly reinforced, for two months. The build was labelled Festung ( “ Fortress ” ) on german maps. Sgt. Pavlov was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union for his actions. The Germans made slow but regular progress through the city. Positions were taken individually, but the Germans were never able to capture the key crossing points along the river bank. By 27 Sept. the Germans occupied the southerly dowry of the city, but the Soviets held the center and northerly part. Most importantly, the Soviets controlled the ferries to their supplies on the east bank of the Volga .
soviet assault troops in the battle
scheme and tactics
german military doctrine was based on the principle of combined-arms teams and close cooperation between tanks, infantry, engineers, weapon and ground-attack aircraft. Some soviet commanders adopted the tactic of constantly keeping their front-line positions as cheeseparing to the Germans as physically potential ; Chuikov called this “ hug ” the Germans. This slowed the german advance and reduced the potency of the german advantage in supporting fire. [ citation needed ] The Red Army gradually adopted a scheme to hold for american samoa long as possible all the earth in the city. frankincense, they converted multi-floored apartment blocks, factories, warehouses, street corner residences and function buildings into a series of well-defended strong-points with small 5–10-man units. Manpower in the city was constantly refreshed by bringing extra troops over the Volga. When a position was lost, an contiguous undertake was normally made to re-take it with fresh forces. [ citation needed ]
Soviets defend a situation. Bitter fighting raged for ruins, streets, factories, houses, basements, and staircases. even the sewers were the sites of firefights. The Germans called this spiritual world urban war Rattenkrieg ( “ Rat War ” ), [ 72 ] and bitterly joked about capturing the kitchen but even fighting for the exist room and the bedroom. Buildings had to be cleared room by room through the bombed-out debris of residential areas, office blocks, basements and apartment high-rises. Some of the improbable buildings, blasted into dispossessed shells by earlier german antenna barrage, saw floor-by-floor, close-quarters combat, with the Germans and Soviets on alternate levels, firing at each other through holes in the floors. [ citation needed ] Fighting on and around Mamayev Kurgan, a big hill above the city, was particularly merciless ; indeed, the place changed hands many times. [ 74 ]
german soldiers positioning themselves for urban war ( colourised ) The Germans used aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery to clear the city with varying degrees of success. Toward the end of the battle, the gigantic dragoon grease-gun nicknamed Dora was brought into the sphere. The Soviets built up a large numeral of artillery batteries on the east bank of the Volga. This weapon was able to bombard the german positions or at least provide counter-battery burn. Snipers on both sides used the ruins to inflict casualties. The most celebrated soviet sniper in Stalingrad was Vasily Zaytsev, with 225 confirm kills during the battle. Targets were often soldiers bringing up food or urine to forward positions. weapon spotters were an particularly respect aim for snipers .
soviet marines landing on the west bank of the Volga River A significant historical debate concerns the degree of terror in the Red Army. The british historian Antony Beevor noted the “ black ” message from the Stalingrad Front ‘s Political Department on 8 October 1942 that : “ The defeatist climate is about eliminated and the total of faithless incidents is getting lower ” as an model of the classify of compulsion Red Army soldiers experienced under the special Detachments ( later to be renamed SMERSH ). On the other hand, Beevor noted the often extraordinary fearlessness of the soviet soldiers in a battle that was merely comparable to Verdun, and argued that terror alone can not explain such selflessness. Richard Overy addresses the motion of good how important the Red Army ‘s coercive methods were to the Soviet war effort compared with early motivational factors such as hatred for the foe. He argues that, though it is “ easy to argue that from the summer of 1942 the soviet army fight because it was forced to fight, ” to concentrate entirely on compulsion is however to “ distort our position of the Soviet war campaign. ” [ 78 ] After conducting hundreds of interviews with soviet veterans on the subject of terror on the Eastern Front – and specifically about Order No. 227 ( “ not a footfall back ! ” ) at Stalingrad – Catherine Merridale notes that, apparently paradoxically, “ their response was frequently relief. ” Infantryman Lev Lvovich ‘s explanation, for example, is typical for these interviews ; as he recalls, “ [ iodine ] deoxythymidine monophosphate was a necessity and crucial dance step. We all knew where we stood after we had heard it. And we all – it ‘s genuine – felt better. Yes, we felt better. ” many women fought on the soviet side or were under fire. As General Chuikov acknowledged, “ Remembering the defense of Stalingrad, I ca n’t overlook the very significant wonder … about the character of women in war, in the rear, but besides at the movement. equally with men they bore all the burdens of combat life and together with us men, they went all the way to Berlin. ” [ 80 ] At the beginning of the struggle there were 75,000 women and girls from the Stalingrad sphere who had finished military or aesculapian train, and all of whom were to serve in the battle. [ 81 ] Women staffed a great many of the anti-aircraft batteries that fought not only the Luftwaffe but german tanks. [ 82 ] Soviet nurses not only treated hurt personnel under fire but were involved in the highly dangerous work of bringing wounded soldiers back to the hospitals under foe fire. [ 83 ] Many of the Soviet wireless and telephone operators were women who frequently suffered arduous casualties when their command posts came under fire. [ 84 ] Though women were not normally trained as infantry, many soviet women fought as machine gunners, mortar operators, and scouts. Women were besides snipers at Stalingrad. [ 86 ] Three air regiments at Stalingrad were entirely female. At least three women won the claim Hero of the Soviet Union while driving tanks at Stalingrad. [ 87 ]
land after the Battle of Stalingrad in the Vladimir Military museum For both Stalin and Hitler, Stalingrad became a topic of prestige army for the liberation of rwanda beyond its strategic significance. The soviet command moved units from the Red Army strategic reserve in the Moscow area to the lower Volga and transferred aircraft from the entire nation to the Stalingrad area. The breed on both military commanders was huge : Paulus developed an uncontrollable tic in his eye, which finally afflicted the left side of his face, while Chuikov experienced an outbreak of eczema that required him to have his hands wholly bandaged. Troops on both sides faced the constant strain of close-range fight. [ 89 ]
Fighting in the industrial district
The Stalingrad Tractor Factory in the northernmost part of the city in 1942 After 27 September, much of the fight in the city shifted north to the industrial zone. Having slowly advanced over 10 days against impregnable soviet resistance, the 51st Army Corps was ultimately in front of the three giant star factories of Stalingrad : the Red October Steel Factory, the Barrikady Arms Factory and Stalingrad Tractor Factory. It took a few more days for them to prepare for the most beast nauseating of all, which was unleashed on 14 October. exceptionally acute shell and fail paved the way for the first german rape groups. The chief attack ( led by the 14th Panzer and 305th Infantry Divisions ) attacked towards the tractor factory, while another assail led by the 24th Panzer Division hit to the south of the elephantine plant .
The german onslaught crushed the 37th Guards Rifle Division of Major General Viktor Zholudev and in the afternoon the ahead assault group reached the tractor factory before arriving at the Volga River, splitting the 62nd Army into two. In reaction to the german discovery to the Volga, the presence headquarters committed three battalions from the 300th Rifle Division and the 45th Rifle Division of Colonel Vasily Sokolov, a solid violence of over 2,000 men, to the fight at the Red October Factory. Fighting raged inside the Barrikady Factory until the end of October. The Soviet-controlled area shrank devour to a few strips of land along the western depository financial institution of the Volga, and in November the active concentrated around what soviet newspapers referred to as “ Lyudnikov ‘s Island ”, a minor plot of ground behind the Barrikady Factory where the remnants of Colonel Ivan Lyudnikov ‘s 138th Rifle Division resisted all ferocious assaults thrown by the Germans and became a symbol of the stout soviet defense of Stalingrad .
Air attacks
From 5 to 12 September, Luftflotte 4 conducted 7,507 sorties ( 938 per day ). From 16 to 25 September, it carried out 9,746 missions ( 975 per day ). Determined to crush soviet resistance, Luftflotte 4 ‘s Stukawaffe flew 900 person sorties against soviet positions at the Stalingrad Tractor Factory on 5 October. respective soviet regiments were wiped out ; the entire staff of the soviet 339th Infantry Regiment was killed the play along dawn during an air foray into. The Luftwaffe retained air superiority into November, and soviet day aeriform resistance was nonexistent. however, the combination of constant air subscribe operations on the german side and the soviet capitulation of the day skies began to affect the strategic proportion in the atmosphere. From 28 June to 20 September, Luftflotte 4 ‘s master force of 1,600 aircraft, of which 1,155 were operational, fell to 950, of which lone 550 were operational. The fleet ‘s sum persuasiveness decreased by 40 percentage. daily sorties decreased from 1,343 per sidereal day to 975 per day. soviet offensives in the central and northern portions of the Eastern Front tied down Luftwaffe reserves and newly built aircraft, reducing Luftflotte 4 ‘s percentage of Eastern Front aircraft from 60 percentage on 28 June to 38 percentage by 20 September. The Kampfwaffe ( bomber wedge ) was the hardest hit, having only 232 out of an original force of 480 left field. The VVS remained qualitatively inferior, but by the time of the soviet counter-offensive, the VVS had reached numeric superiority. In mid-October, after receiving reinforcements from the Caucasus field, the Luftwaffe intensified its efforts against the remaining bolshevik Army positions holding the west bank. Luftflotte 4 flew 1,250 sorties on 14 October and its Stukas dropped 550 tonnes of bombs, while german infantry surrounded the three factories. [ 98 ] Stukageschwader 1, 2, and 77 had largely silenced soviet artillery on the easterly bank of the Volga before turning their attention to the ship that was once again trying to reinforce the narrowing soviet pockets of electric resistance. The 62nd Army had been cut in two and, due to intensive air assail on its issue ferries, was receiving much less material support. With the Soviets forced into a 1-kilometre ( 1,000-yard ) plunder of estate on the western bank of the Volga, over 1,208 Stuka missions were flown in an feat to eliminate them .
Clouds of smoke and dust rise from the ruins of the canning factory in Stalingrad South after german bombing of the city on 2 October 1942. The soviet bomber force, the Aviatsiya Dal’nego Deystviya ( Long Range Aviation ; ADD ), having taken cripple losses over the past 18 months, was restricted to flying at night. The Soviets flew 11,317 night sorties over Stalingrad and the Don-bend sector between 17 July and 19 November. These raids caused little damage and were of pain value lone. [ 101 ] : 265 On 8 November, substantial units from Luftflotte 4 were withdrawn to combat the Allied landings in North Africa. The german tune weapon found itself diffuse thinly across Europe, struggling to maintain its strength in the other southerly sectors of the Soviet-German battlefront. [ notice 4 ] As historian Chris Bellamy notes, the Germans paid a high strategic price for the aircraft sent into Stalingrad : the Luftwaffe was forced to divert much of its air potency away from the oil-rich Caucasus, which had been Hitler ‘s original grand-strategic objective. [ 102 ] The Royal Romanian Air Force was besides involved in the Axis tune operations at Stalingrad. Starting 23 October 1942, romanian pilots flew a total of 4,000 sorties, during which they destroyed 61 soviet aircraft. The romanian Air Force lost 79 aircraft, most of them captured on the earth along with their airfields. [ 103 ]
Germans reach the Volga
After three months of dense promote, the Germans ultimately reached the river banks, capturing 90 % of the ruined city and splitting the remaining soviet forces into two specialize pockets. Ice floes on the Volga now prevented boats and tugs from supplying the soviet defenders. however, the fighting continued, particularly on the slopes of Mamayev Kurgan and inside the factory sphere in the northern partially of the city. [ 104 ] From 21 August to 20 November, the german 6th Army lost 60,548 men, including 12,782 killed, 45,545 wounded and 2,221 missing. [ 105 ]
soviet counter-offensives
soviet soldiers attack, February 1943. The destroy Railwaymen ‘s Building is in the background. Recognising that german troops were ill-prepared for offensive operations during the winter of 1942 and that most of them were redeployed elsewhere on the southerly sector of the Eastern Front, the Stavka decided to conduct a count of offensive operations between 19 November 1942 and 2 February 1943. These operations opened the Winter Campaign of 1942–1943 ( 19 November 1942 – 3 March 1943 ), which involved some fifteen Armies operating on several fronts. According to Zhukov, “ german operational blunders were aggravated by poor intelligence : they failed to spot preparations for the major counter-offensive near Stalingrad where there were 10 field, 1 tank and 4 air armies. ”
weakness on the german flanks
During the siege, the german and allied italian, hungarian, and romanian armies protecting Army Group B ‘s north and south flanks had pressed their headquarters for support. The hungarian 2nd Army was given the tax of defending a 200 kilometer ( 120 nautical mile ) section of the front north of Stalingrad between the italian Army and Voronezh. This resulted in a very flimsy line, with some sectors where 1–2 kilometer ( 0.62–1.24 mile ) stretches were being defended by a single platoon ( platoons typically have approximately 20 to 50 men ). These forces were besides lacking in effective anti-tank weapons. Zhukov states, “ Compared with the Germans, the troops of the satellites were not so well armed, less experience and less effective, flush in defensive structure. ”
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Because of the total focus on the city, the Axis forces had neglected for months to consolidate their positions along the natural defensive line of the Don River. The soviet forces were allowed to retain bridgeheads on the justly bank from which offensive operations could be quickly launched. These bridgeheads in review presented a good menace to Army Group B. similarly, on the southerly flank of the Stalingrad sector, the front southwest of Kotelnikovo was held merely by the romanian 4th Army. beyond that united states army, a single german division, the 16th mechanize Infantry, covered 400 kilometer. Paulus had requested license to “ withdraw the 6th Army behind the Don, ” but was rejected. According to Paulus ‘ comments to Adam, “ There is still the ordering whereby no commander of an army group or an army has the right to relinquish a village, even a trench, without Hitler ‘s consent. ”
operation Uranus : the soviet dysphemistic
german front, 19 November
german movement, 12 December
german presence, 24 December
soviet promote, 19–28 November The soviet counter-attack at Stalingrad In fall, the soviet generals Georgy Zhukov and Aleksandr Vasilevsky, creditworthy for strategic plan in the Stalingrad area, concentrated forces in the steppes to the north and south of the city. The northern flank was defended by Hungarian and Romanian units, often in open positions on the steppes. The natural argumentation of refutation, the Don River, had never been by rights established by the german side. The armies in the area were besides ailing equipped in terms of anti-tank weapons. The design was to punch through the pull and weakly defend german flanks and surround the german forces in the Stalingrad region. During the preparations for the attack, Marshal Zhukov personally visited the front and noticing the poor administration, insisted on a one-week check in the begin date of the planned attack. The operation was code-named “ Uranus ” and launched in concurrence with Operation Mars, which was directed at Army Group Center. The plan was similar to the one Zhukov had used to achieve victory at Khalkhin Gol three years before, where he had sprung a double enclosure and destroyed the 23rd Division of the japanese united states army. [ 110 ]
On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus. The attacking soviet units under the command of Gen. Nikolay Vatutin consisted of three accomplished armies, the 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank Army and 21st Army, including a sum of 18 infantry divisions, eight tank brigades, two motorised brigades, six cavalry divisions and one anti-tank brigade. The preparations for the attack could be heard by the Romanians, who continued to push for reinforcements, only to be refused again. thinly banquet, deployed in debunk positions, outnumbered and ill equipped, the romanian 3rd Army, which held the northern flank of the german 6th Army, was overrun. Behind the battlefront lines, no preparations had been made to defend key points in the rear such as Kalach. The response by the Wehrmacht was both chaotic and indecisive. Poor weather prevented effective atmosphere action against the soviet nauseating. Army Group B was in disarray and faced strong soviet pressure across all its fronts. hence it was ineffective in relieving the 6th Army. On 20 November, a second soviet nauseating ( two armies ) was launched to the south of Stalingrad against points held by the romanian 4th Army Corps. The romanian forces, made up chiefly of infantry, were overrun by large numbers of tanks. The soviet forces raced west and met on 23 November at the town of Kalach, sealing the closed chain around Stalingrad. The link-up of the soviet forces, not filmed at the time, was later re-enacted for a propaganda movie which was shown cosmopolitan. [ citation needed ] .
sixth Army surrounded
romanian soldiers near Stalingrad german soldiers as prisoners of war. In the setting is the heavily fought-over Stalingrad granulate elevator . Germans dead in the city The wall Axis personnel comprised 265,000 Germans, Romanians, Italians, [ 112 ] and the Croatians. In accession, the german 6th Army included between 40,000 and 65,000 Hilfswillige ( Hiwi ), or “ volunteer auxiliaries ”, [ 113 ] [ 114 ] a term used for personnel recruited amongst soviet POWs and civilians from areas under occupation. Hiwi often proved to be dependable Axis personnel in buttocks areas and were used for supporting roles, but besides served in some front-line units as their numbers had increased. [ 114 ] german personnel in the pocket numbered about 210,000, according to forte breakdowns of the 20 plain divisions ( average size 9,000 ) and 100 battalion-sized units of the Sixth Army on 19 November 1942. Inside the pocket ( german : Kessel, literally “ caldron ” ), there were besides about 10,000 soviet civilians and several thousand soviet soldiers the Germans had taken prisoner during the battle. not all of the 6th Army was trapped : 50,000 soldiers were brushed aside outside the pocket. These belonged by and large to the other two divisions of the 6th Army between the italian and romanian armies : the 62nd and 298th Infantry Divisions. Of the 210,000 Germans, 10,000 remained to fight on, 105,000 surrendered, 35,000 left by air out and the remaining 60,000 died. even with the desperate position of the 6th Army, Army Group A continued their invasion of the Caucasus far south from 19 November until 19 December. entirely on December 23, was Army Group A ordered to withdraw from the Caucasus to avoid from being trapped there. [ 115 ] Hence Army Group A was never used to help relieve the Sixth Army. Army Group Don was formed under Field Marshal von Manstein. Under his instruction were the twenty german and two romanian divisions encircled at Stalingrad, Adam ‘s battle groups formed along the Chir River and on the Don bridgehead, plus the remains of the romanian 3rd Army. The Red Army units immediately formed two defensive fronts : a circumvallation facing inward and a contravallation facing outbound. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein advised Hitler not to rate the 6th Army to break out, stating that he could break through the Soviet lines and relieve the besiege 6th Army. The american historians Williamson Murray and Alan Millet wrote that it was Manstein ‘s message to Hitler on 24 November advising him that the 6th Army should not break out, along with Göring ‘s statements that the Luftwaffe could supply Stalingrad that “ … sealed the destiny of the Sixth Army. ” [ 119 ] After 1945, Manstein claimed that he told Hitler that the 6th Army must break out. The american historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that Manstein distorted his commemorate on the matter. Manstein was tasked to conduct a relief operation, named Operation Winter Storm ( Unternehmen Wintergewitter ) against Stalingrad, which he thought was feasible if the 6th Army was temporarily supplied through the air. Adolf Hitler had declared in a public manner of speaking ( in the Berlin Sportpalast ) on 30 September 1942 that the german army would never leave the city. At a converge shortly after the soviet blockade, german army chiefs pushed for an immediate break to a raw line on the west of the Don, but Hitler was at his bavarian withdraw of Obersalzberg in Berchtesgaden with the head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring. When asked by Hitler, Göring replied, after being convinced by Hans Jeschonnek, that the Luftwaffe could supply the 6th Army with an “ publicize bridge. ” This would allow the Germans in the city to fight on temporarily while a respite force was assembled. A alike plan had been used a year earlier at the Demyansk Pocket, albeit on a much smaller scale : a corps at Demyansk rather than an integral army .
A Ju 52 approaching Stalingrad The conductor of Luftflotte 4, Wolfram von Richthofen, tried to get this decision overturned. The forces under the 6th Army were about twice deoxyadenosine monophosphate bombastic as a regular german united states army unit, plus there was besides a corporation of the fourth Panzer Army trapped in the pocket. Due to a specify count of available aircraft and having only one available airfield, at Pitomnik, the Luftwaffe could alone deliver 105 tonnes of supplies per day, entirely a divide of the minimal 750 tonnes that both Paulus and Zeitzler estimated the 6th Army needed. [ 125 ] [ Note 5 ] To supplement the limited number of Junkers Ju 52 transports, the Germans pressed other aircraft into the character, such as the Heinkel He 177 bomber ( some bombers performed adequately – the Heinkel He 111 proved to be quite adequate to and was much faster than the Ju 52 ). General Richthofen informed Manstein on 27 November of the little transport capacity of the Luftwaffe and the impossibility of supplying 300 tons a day by air. Manstein immediately saw the enormous technical difficulties of a provide by air of these dimensions. The following day he made a six-page situation composition to the general staff. Based on the information of the technical Richthofen, he declared that contrary to the model of the pocket of Demyansk the permanent issue by vent would be impossible. If lone a narrow associate could be established to Sixth Army, he proposed that this should be used to pull it out from the blockade, and said that the Luftwaffe should rather of supplies deliver entirely enough ammunition and fuel for a break attack. He acknowledged the arduous moral forfeit that giving up Stalingrad would mean, but this would be made easier to bear by conserving the battle power of the Sixth Army and regaining the first step. He ignored the limited mobility of the army and the difficulties of disengaging the Soviets. Hitler reiterated that the Sixth Army would stay at Stalingrad and that the air bridge would supply it until the blockade was broken by a new german dysphemistic. Supplying the 270,000 men trapped in the “ caldron ” required 700 tons of supplies a day. That would mean 350 Ju 52 flights a day into Pitomnik. At a minimum, 500 tons were required. however, according to Adam, “ On not one individual day have the minimal essential count of tons of supplies been flown in. ” The Luftwaffe was able to deliver an average of 85 tonnes of supplies per day out of an air transmit capacity of 106 tonnes per day. The most successful day, 19 December, the Luftwaffe delivered 262 tonnes of supplies in 154 flights. The result of the airlift was the Luftwaffe ‘s failure to provide its conveyance units with the tools they needed to maintain an adequate count of functional aircraft – tools that included airfield facilities, supplies, work force, and even aircraft suited to the prevail conditions. These factors, taken in concert, prevented the Luftwaffe from efficaciously employing the full potential of its transport forces, ensuring that they were unable to deliver the measure of supplies needed to sustain the 6th Army. [ 128 ] In the early parts of the operation, fuel was shipped at a higher priority than food and ammunition because of a belief that there would be a break from the city. Transport aircraft besides evacuated technical specialists and disgusted or hurt personnel from the besieged enclave. Sources differ on the number flown out : at least 25,000 to at most 35,000 .
The concentrate of Stalingrad after liberation initially, supply flights came in from the discipline at Tatsinskaya, called ‘Tazi ‘ by the german pilots. On 23 December, the soviet twenty-fourth cooler Corps, commanded by Major-General Vasily Mikhaylovich Badanov, reached nearby Skassirskaya and in the early dawn of 24 December, the tanks reached Tatsinskaya. Without any soldiers to defend the airfield, it was abandoned under heavy fire ; in a little under an hour, 108 Ju 52s and 16 Ju 86s took off for Novocherkassk – leaving 72 Ju 52s and many early aircraft burning on the flat coat. A new base was established some 300 km ( 190 security service ) from Stalingrad at Salsk, the extra distance would become another obstacle to the resupply efforts. Salsk was abandoned in sour by mid-january for a rocky adeptness at Zverevo, near Shakhty. The field at Zverevo was attacked repeatedly on 18 January and a further 50 Ju 52s were destroyed. Winter weather conditions, technical failures, heavy soviet anti-aircraft displace and fighter interceptions finally led to the personnel casualty of 488 german aircraft. In cattiness of the failure of the german offensive to reach the 6th Army, the air provision process continued under always more unmanageable circumstances. The 6th Army slowly starved. General Zeitzler, moved by their plight, began to limit himself to their slender rations at meal times. After a few weeks on such a diet, he had “ visibly lost weight unit ”, according to Albert Speer, and Hitler “ commanded Zeitzler to resume at once taking sufficient nutriment. ” [ 131 ] The bell on the Transportgruppen was heavy. 160 aircraft were destroyed and 328 were heavily damaged ( beyond repair ). Some 266 Junkers Ju 52s were destroyed ; one-third of the flit ‘s forte on the Eastern Front. The He 111 gruppen lost 165 aircraft in transport operations. other losses included 42 Ju 86s, 9 Fw 200 Condors, 5 He 177 bombers and 1 Ju 290. The Luftwaffe besides lost cheeseparing to 1,000 highly know bomber crew personnel. so heavy were the Luftwaffe ‘s losses that four of Luftflotte 4 ‘s tape drive units ( KGrzbV 700, KGrzbV 900, I./KGrzbV 1 and II./KGzbV 1 ) were “ formally dissolved. ”
end of the conflict
Operation Winter Storm
Manstein ‘s plan to rescue the Sixth Army – Operation Winter Storm – was developed in full consultation with Führer headquarters. It aimed to break through to the Sixth Army and establish a corridor to keep it provide and reinforced, so that, according to Hitler ‘s ordering, it could maintain its “ cornerstone ” status on the Volga, “ with respect to operations in 1943 ”. Manstein, however, who knew that Sixth Army could not survive the winter there, instructed his headquarters to draw up a promote design in the consequence of Hitler ‘s seeing sense. This would include the subsequent break of Sixth Army, in the consequence of a successful first phase, and its physical reincorporation in Army Group Don. This second plan was given the name Operation Thunderclap. Winter Storm, as Zhukov had predicted, was in the first place planned as a two-pronged attack. One thrust would come from the area of Kotelnikovo, well to the south, and around 160 kilometres ( 100 myocardial infarction ) from the Sixth Army. The other would start from the Chir front west of the Don, which was little more than 60 kilometres ( 40 nautical mile ) from the edge of the Kessel, but the continuing attacks of Romanenko ‘s fifth Tank Army against the german detachments along the river Chir ruled out that start-line. This left merely the LVII Panzer Corps around Kotelnikovo, supported by the perch of Hoth ‘s identical mix Fourth Panzer Army, to relieve Paulus ‘s trap divisions. The LVII Panzer Corps, commanded by General Friedrich Kirchner, had been watery at first gear. It consisted of two romanian cavalry divisions and the 23rd Panzer Division, which mustered no more than thirty serviceable tanks. The 6th Panzer Division, arriving from France, was a vastly more powerful formation, but its members barely received an promote impression. The austrian divisional commander, General Erhard Raus, was summoned to Manstein ‘s royal baby buggy in Kharkov station on 24 November, where the field marshal briefed him. “ He described the position in very somber terms ”, recorded Raus. Three days late, when the first trainload of Raus ‘s class steamed into Kotelnikovo post to unload, his troops were greeted by “ a hail of shells ” from soviet batteries. “ a flying as lightning, the Panzergrenadiers jumped from their wagons. But already the enemy was attacking the station with their battle-cries of ‘Urrah ! ‘ ” By 18 December, the german Army had pushed to within 48 km ( 30 michigan ) of Sixth Army ‘s positions. however, the predictable nature of the easing operation brought significant risk for all german forces in the area. The starved encircled forces at Stalingrad made no attack to break out or link up with Manstein ‘s advance. Some german officers requested that Paulus defy Hitler ‘s orders to stand fast and rather attempt to break out of the Stalingrad pocket. Paulus refused, concerned about the Red Army attacks on the flank of Army Group Don and Army Group B in their overture on Rostov-on-Don, “ an early abandonment ” of Stalingrad “ would result in the destruction of Army Group A in the Caucasus ”, and the fact that his 6th Army tanks only had fuel for a 30 kilometer gain towards Hoth ‘s spearhead, a bootless attempt if they did not meet assurance of resupply by publicize. Of his questions to Army Group Don, Paulus was told, “ Wait, enforce Operation ‘Thunderclap ‘ only on explicit orders ! ” – Operation Thunderclap being the code word initiating the break .
Operation Little Saturn
soviet gains ( shown in blue ) during Operation Little Saturn On 16 December, the Soviets launched Operation Little Saturn, which attempted to punch through the Axis united states army ( chiefly Italians ) on the Don and take Rostov-on-Don. The Germans set up a “ fluid refutation ” of modest units that were to hold towns until supporting armour arrived. From the soviet bridgehead at Mamon, 15 divisions – supported by at least 100 tanks – attacked the italian Cosseria and Ravenna Divisions, and although outnumber 9 to 1, the Italians initially fight well, with the Germans praising the timbre of the italian defenders, but on 19 December, with the italian lines disintegrating, ARMIR headquarters ordered the battered divisions to withdraw to new lines. [ 135 ] The fight forced a total reappraisal of the german position. Sensing that this was the last prospect for a break, Manstein pleaded with Hitler on 18 December, but Hitler refused. Paulus himself besides doubted the feasibility of such a break. The attempt to break through to Stalingrad was abandoned and Army Group A was ordered to pull back from the Caucasus. The 6th Army now was beyond all promise of german respite. While a motorised break might have been possible in the first few weeks, the 6th Army now had insufficient fuel and the german soldiers would have faced big difficulty breaking through the Soviet lines on foundation in harsh winter conditions. But in its defensive side on the Volga, the 6th Army continued to tie down a significant number of soviet Armies. On 23 December, the attack to relieve Stalingrad was abandoned and Manstein ‘s forces switched over to the defensive to deal with newfangled soviet offensives. As Zhukov states, “ The military and political leadership of Nazi Germany sought not to relieve them, but to get them to fight on for as long potential so as to tie up the soviet forces. The calculate was to win as much fourth dimension as potential to withdraw forces from the Caucasus ( Army Group A ) and to rush troops from other Fronts to form a new front that would be able in some standard to check our counter-offensive. ”
soviet victory
Commander-in-chief of the Don Front The Stalingrad Master General Konstantin Rokossovsky 759,560 soviet personnel were awarded this decoration for the defense of Stalingrad from 22 December 1942. The Red Army High Command sent three envoys while simultaneously aircraft and loudspeakers announced terms of capitulation on 7 January 1943. The letter was signed by Colonel-General of Artillery Voronov and the commander-in-chief of the Don Front, Lieutenant-General Rokossovsky. A subordinate soviet emissary party ( comprising Major Aleksandr Smyslov, Captain Nikolay Dyatlenko and a trumpeter ) carried generous surrender terms to Paulus : if he surrendered within 24 hours, he would receive a guarantee of safety for all prisoners, aesculapian worry for the vomit and wounded, prisoners being allowed to keep their personal belongings, “ convention ” food rations, and repatriation to any nation they wished after the war. Rokossovsky ‘s letter besides stressed that Paulus ‘ men were in an indefensible position. Paulus requested permission to surrender, but Hitler rejected Paulus ‘ request out of hand. consequently, Paulus did not respond. The german High Command informed Paulus, “ Every day that the army holds out longer helps the whole front and draws away the russian divisions from it. ” The Germans inside the pocket retreated from the suburb of Stalingrad to the city itself. The loss of the two airfields, at Pitomnik on 16 January 1943 and Gumrak on the night of 21/22 January, [ 142 ] meant an end to publicize supplies and to the emptying of the injure. [ 31 ] : 98 The third and concluding serviceable runway was at the Stalingradskaya flight school, which reportedly had the last landings and takeoffs on 23 January. [ 51 ] After 23 January, there were no more report landings, good intermittent breeze drops of ammunition and food until the end. The Germans were now not only starving but running out of ammunition. however, they continued to resist, in part because they believed the Soviets would execute any who surrendered. In particular, the alleged HiWis, soviet citizens fighting for the Germans, had no illusions about their destiny if captured. The Soviets were initially surprised by the number of Germans they had trapped and had to reinforce their encircling troops. Bloody urban war began again in Stalingrad, but this clock time it was the Germans who were pushed bet on to the banks of the Volga. The Germans adopted a bare defense of fixing wire nets over all windows to protect themselves from grenades. The Soviets responded by fixing fish hooks to the grenades so they stuck to the nets when throw. The Germans had no useable tanks in the city, and those that calm functioned could, at best, be used as improvised pillboxes. The Soviets did not bother employing tanks in areas where urban destruction restricted their mobility .
On 22 January, Rokossovsky once again offered Paulus a probability to surrender. Paulus requested that he be granted license to accept the terms. He told Hitler that he was no longer able to command his men, who were without ammunition or food. Hitler rejected it on a point of honor. He telegraphed the 6th Army later that day, claiming that it had made a historic contribution to the greatest struggle in german history and that it should stand fast “ to the last soldier and the last bullet. ” Hitler told Goebbels that the pledge of the 6th Army was a “ heroic drama of german history. ” [ 145 ] On 24 January, in his radio report to Hitler, Paulus reported : “ 18,000 wounded without the slightest aid of bandages and medicines. ” On 26 January 1943, the german forces inside Stalingrad were split into two pockets north and south of Mamayev-Kurgan. The northern air pocket dwell of the VIIIth Corps, under General Walter Heitz, and the XIth Corps, was now cut off from call communication with Paulus in the southerly pocket. now “ each region of the caldron came personally under Hitler. ” On 28 January, the caldron was split into three parts. The northerly caldron consisted of the XIth Corps, the cardinal with the VIIIth and LIst Corps, and the southerly with the XIVth Panzer Corps and IVth Corps “ without units ”. The pale and wounded reached 40,000 to 50,000. On 30 January 1943, the tenth anniversary of Hitler ‘s coming to office, Goebbels read out a announcement that included the sentence : “ The heroic struggle of our soldiers on the Volga should be a warn for everybody to do the utmost for the conflict for Germany ‘s freedom and the future of our people, and frankincense in a wide-eyed smell for the maintenance of our entire continent. ” [ 149 ] Paulus notified Hitler that his men would likely collapse before the day was knocked out. In reaction, Hitler issued a tranche of field promotions to the Sixth Army ‘s officers. Most notably, he promoted Paulus to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall. In deciding to promote Paulus, Hitler noted that there was no record of a german or prussian field marshal having ever surrendered. The implication was clear : if Paulus surrendered, he would shame himself and would become the highest-ranking german officer ever to be captured. Hitler believed that Paulus would either fight to the last man or commit suicide. On the next day, the southern pocket in Stalingrad collapsed. soviet forces reached the entrance to the german headquarters in the done for GUM department store. When interrogated by the Soviets, Paulus claimed that he had not surrendered. He said that he had been taken by surprise. He denied that he was the commander of the remaining northerly pocket in Stalingrad and refused to issue an order in his name for them to surrender. [ 152 ] [ 153 ] There was no cameraman to film the capture of Paulus, but one of them ( Roman Karmen ) was able to record his beginning interrogation this same day, at Shumilov ‘s sixty-fourth Army ‘s HQ, and a few hours late at Rokossovsky ‘s Don Front HQ. [ 154 ] The cardinal pocket, under the command of Heitz, surrendered the same day, while the northern pouch, under the command of General Karl Strecker, held out for two more days. Four soviet armies were deployed against the northern pocket. At four in the morning on 2 February, Strecker was informed that one of his own officers had gone to the Soviets to negotiate surrender terms. Seeing no period in continuing, he sent a radio message saying that his command had done its duty and fight to the last homo. When Strecker ultimately surrendered, he and his foreman of staff, Helmuth Groscurth, drafted the concluding signal transport from Stalingrad, intentionally omitting the customary ecphonesis to Hitler, replacing it with “ Long live Germany ! ” Around 91,000 exhausted, ill, wounded, and starving prisoners were taken, including 3,000 Romanians ( the survivors of the twentieth Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and “ Col. Voicu ” separation ). [ 157 ] [ self-published source? ] The prisoners included 22 generals. Hitler was angry and confided that Paulus “ could have freed himself from all sorrow and ascended into eternity and home immortality, but he prefers to go to Moscow. ” [ 158 ]
Casualties
The calculation of casualties depends on what setting is given to the Battle of Stalingrad. The scope can vary from the active in the city and suburbs to the inclusion of about all fight on the southern fly of the Soviet-German front from the bounce of 1942 to the end of the fight in the city in the winter of 1943. Scholars have produced different estimates depending on their definition of the setting of the conflict. The difference is comparing the city against the region. The Axis suffered 647,300 – 968,374 total casualties ( killed, wounded or captured ) among all branches of the german arm forces and its allies :
- 282,606 in the 6th Army from 21 August to the end of the battle; 17,293 in the 4th Panzer Army from 21 August to 31 January; 55,260 in the Army Group Don from 1 December 1942 to the end of the battle (12,727 killed, 37,627 wounded and 4,906 missing)[105][159] Walsh estimates the losses to 6th Army and 4th Panzer division were over 300,000; including other German army groups between late June 1942 and February 1943, total German casualties were over 600,000.[160] Louis A. DiMarco estimated the German suffered 400,000 total casualties (killed, wounded or captured) during this battle.
- According to Frieser, et al.: 109,000 Romanians casualties (from November 1942 to December 1942), included 70,000 captured or missing. 114,000 Italians and 105,000 Hungarians were killed, wounded or captured (from December 1942 to February 1943).
- According to Stephen Walsh: Romanian casualties were 158,854; 114,520 Italians (84,830 killed, missing and 29,690 wounded); and 143,000 Hungarian (80,000 killed, missing and 63,000 wounded). Losses among Soviet POW turncoats Hiwis, or Hilfswillige range between 19,300 and 52,000.[14]
235,000 german and allied troops in total, from all units, including Manstein ‘s doomed relief impel, were captured during the battle. [ 162 ] The Germans lost 900 aircraft ( including 274 transports and 165 bombers used as transports ), 500 tanks and 6,000 weapon pieces. According to a contemporary soviet report, 5,762 guns, 1,312 mortars, 12,701 heavy machine guns, 156,987 rifles, 80,438 sub-machine guns, 10,722 trucks, 744 aircraft ; 1,666 tanks, 261 other armored vehicles, 571 half-tracks and 10,679 motorcycles were captured by the Soviets. [ 164 ] In addition, an unknown come of Hungarian, Italian, and romanian materiel was lost. The site of the romanian tanks is known, however. Before Operation Uranus, the 1st romanian Armoured Division consisted of 121 r-2 light tanks and 19 German-produced tanks ( Panzer III and IV ). All of the 19 german tanks were lost, ampere well as 81 of the R-2 light tanks. alone 27 of the latter were lost in combat, however, the remaining 54 being abandoned after breaking down or running out of fuel. ultimately, however, romanian armoured war proved to be a tactical success, as the Romanians destroyed 127 soviet tanks for the monetary value of their 100 lost units. romanian forces destroyed 62 soviet tanks on 20 November for the monetary value of 25 tanks of their own, followed by 65 more soviet tanks on 22 November, for the cost of 10 tanks of their own. [ 165 ] More soviet tanks were destroyed as they overran the romanian airfields. This was accomplished by romanian Vickers/Reșița 75 mm anti-aircraft guns, which proved effective against soviet armor. The conflict for the German-Romanian airfield at Karpova lasted two days, with romanian gunners destroying numerous soviet tanks. later, when the Tatsinskaya Airfield was besides captured, the romanian 75 millimeter guns destroyed five more soviet tanks. [ 166 ] The USSR, according to archival figures, suffered 1,129,619 sum casualties ; 478,741 personnel killed or missing, and 650,878 wounded or pale. The USSR lost 4,341 tanks destroyed or damaged, 15,728 artillery pieces and 2,769 fight aircraft. [ 15 ] [ 167 ] 955 soviet civilians died in Stalingrad and its suburb from aeriform fail by Luftflotte 4 as the german 4th Panzer and 6th Armies approached the city .
luftwaffe losses
The losses of enchant planes were particularly good, as they destroyed the capacity for provision of the trap 6th Army. The destruction of 72 aircraft when the airfield at Tatsinskaya was overrun meant the loss of about 10 percentage of the Luftwaffe transportation fleet. [ 168 ] These losses amounted to about 50 percentage of the aircraft committed and the Luftwaffe train plan was stopped and sorties in early theatres of war were significantly reduced to save fuel for use at Stalingrad .
consequence
The aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad A soviet soldier marches a german soldier into enslavement . Generalfeldmarschall Paulus meets with Generaloberst Paulus meets with Walter Heitz, then the two highest ranking german officers captured by the Allies, 4 February 1943 The german public was not officially told of the at hand calamity until the conclusion of January 1943, though positive media reports had stopped in the weeks before the announcement. [ 169 ] Stalingrad marked the first time that the nazi government publicly acknowledged a failure in its war effort. On 31 January, regular programmes on german state radio were replaced by a broadcast of the drab Adagio apparent motion from Anton Bruckner ‘s Seventh Symphony, followed by the announcement of the get the better of at Stalingrad. [ 169 ] On 18 February, Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels gave the celebrated Sportpalast manner of speaking in Berlin, encouraging the Germans to accept a total war that would claim all resources and efforts from the integral population. Based on soviet records, over 11,000 german soldiers continued to resist in detached groups within the city for the adjacent month. [ citation needed ] Some have presumed that they were motivated by a impression that fighting on was better than a boring death in soviet enslavement. Brown University historian Omer Bartov claims they were motivated by impression in Hitler and National Socialism. He studied 11,237 letters sent by soldiers inside of Stalingrad between 20 December 1942 and 16 January 1943 to their families in Germany. Almost every letter expressed belief in Germany ‘s ultimate victory and their willingness to fight and die at Stalingrad to achieve that victory. Bartov reported that a great many of the soldiers were well aware that they would not be able to escape from Stalingrad but in their letters to their families boasted that they were gallant to “ sacrifice themselves for the Führer ”. The remaining forces continued to resist, hiding in cellars and sewers, but by early March 1943 the survive small and apart pockets of resistance had surrendered. According to soviet intelligence documents shown in the documentary, a remarkable NKVD report from March 1943 is available showing the doggedness of some of these german groups :
The mopping-up of counter-revolutionary elements in the city of Stalingrad proceeded. The german soldiers – who had hidden themselves in huts and trenches – offered armed resistance after fight actions had already ended. This armed resistor continued until 15 February and in a few areas until 20 February. Most of the armed groups were liquidated by March … During this time period of arm conflict with the Germans, the brigade ‘s units killed 2,418 soldiers and officers and captured 8,646 soldiers and officers, escorting them to POW camps and handing them over .
The operative report of the Don Front ‘s staff issued on 5 February 1943, 22:00 said ,
The 64th Army was putting itself in order, being in previously occupied regions. placement of united states army ‘s units is as it was previously. In the area of location of the 38th Motorised Rifle Brigade in a basement eighteen armed SS-men ( sic ) were found, who refused to surrender, the Germans found were destroyed. [ 172 ]
The condition of the troops that surrendered was deplorable. british war analogous Alexander Werth described the surveil scenery in his Russia at War book, based on a first-hand account of his visit to Stalingrad on 3–5 February 1943 ,
We [ … ] went into the yard of the large cauterize out build of the Red Army House ; and here one realised particularly intelligibly what the last days of Stalingrad had been to sol many of the Germans. In the porch lay the skeletal system of a knight, with only a few scraps of kernel inactive clinging to its rib. then we came into the thousand. here lay more more [ sic? ] horses ‘ skeletons, and to the right, there was an enormous atrocious cesspool – fortunately, freeze solid. And then, suddenly, at the far end of the yard I caught sight of a homo figure. He had been crouching over another cesspool, and now, noticing us, he was hurriedly pulling up his pants, and then he slunk off into the doorway of the basement. But as he passed, I caught a glimpse of the poor devil ‘s face – with its mix of suffering and idiot-like incomprehension. For a consequence, I wished that the whole of Germany were there to see it. The homo was credibly already dying. In that basement [ … ] there were still two hundred Germans—dying of hunger and frostbite. “ We have n’t had time to deal with them however, ” one of the Russians said. “ They ‘ll be taken away tomorrow, I suppose. ” And, at the far conclusion of the thousand, besides the other cesspool, behind a low stone wall, the yellow corpses of skinny Germans were piled up – men who had died in that basement—about a twelve wax-like dummies. We did not go into the basement itself – what was the function ? There was nothing we could do for them .
Out of the about 91,000 german prisoners captured in Stalingrad, entirely about 5,000 returned. [ 174 ] Weakened by disease, starvation and miss of aesculapian manage during the blockade, they were sent on foot marches to prisoner camps and late to labour camps all over the Soviet Union. Some 35,000 were finally sent on transports, of which 17,000 did not survive. Most die of wounds, disease ( particularly typhus ), cold, overwork, mistreatment and malnutrition. Some were kept in the city to help rebuild it. A handful of elder officers were taken to Moscow and used for propaganda purposes, and some of them joined the National Committee for a Free Germany. Some, including Paulus, signed anti-Hitler statements that were broadcast to german troops. Paulus testified for the prosecution during the Nuremberg Trials and reassure families in Germany that those soldiers taken prisoner at Stalingrad were condom. He remained in the Soviet Union until 1952, then moved to Dresden in East Germany, where he spent the remainder of his days defending his actions at Stalingrad and was quoted as saying that Communism was the best hope for postwar Europe. General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach offered to raise an anti-Hitler army from the Stalingrad survivors, but the Soviets did not accept. It was not until 1955 that the concluding of the 5,000–6,000 survivors were repatriated ( to West Germany ) after a plea to the Politburo by Konrad Adenauer .
significance
Stalingrad has been described as the greatest defeat in the history of the german Army. It is much identified as the turning point on the Eastern Front, in the war against Germany overall, and in the entire Second World War. [ 179 ] The Red Army had the first step, and the Wehrmacht was in retreat. A year of german gains during Case Blue had been wiped out. Germany ‘s Sixth Army had ceased to exist, and the forces of Germany ‘s european allies, except Finland, had been shattered. In a actor’s line on 9 November 1944, Hitler himself blamed Stalingrad for Germany ‘s at hand sentence. The end of an entire army ( the largest killed, captured, wounded figures for Axis soldiers, closely 1 million, during the war ) and the frustration of Germany ‘s grand scheme made the conflict a landmark consequence. At the time, the global meaning of the struggle was not in doubt. Writing in his diary on 1 January 1943, British General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, reflected on the change in the position from a year before :
I felt Russia could never hold, Caucasus was bound to be penetrated, and Abadan ( our Achilles heel ) would be captured with the attendant crumble of Middle East, India, etc. After Russia ‘s defeat how were we to handle the german land and breeze forces liberated ? England would be again bombarded, threat of invasion revived … And now ! We start 1943 under conditions I would never have dared to hope. Russia has held, Egypt for the present is safe. There is a hope of clearing North Africa of Germans in the dear future … Russia is scoring fantastic successes in Southern Russia .
At this decimal point, the british had won the Battle of El Alamein in November 1942. however, there were only about 50,000 german soldiers at El Alamein in Egypt, while at Stalingrad 300,000 to 400,000 Germans had been lost. careless of the strategic implications, there is little doubt about Stalingrad ‘s symbolism. Germany ‘s frustration shattered its repute for indomitability and dealt a devastating boast to german morale. On 30 January 1943, the one-tenth anniversary of his coming to exponent, Hitler chose not to speak. Joseph Goebbels read the textbook of his manner of speaking for him on the radio. The speech contained an devious reference to the battle, which suggested that Germany was nowadays in a defensive war. The populace temper was sullen, depressed, fearful, and war-weary. Germany was looking in the grimace of kill. The rearward was the shell on the soviet side. There was an overpowering billow in confidence and impression in victory. A common saying was : “ You can not stop an army which has done Stalingrad. ” Stalin was feted as the hero of the hour and made a Marshal of the Soviet Union. The news program of the battle resound round the earth, with many people now believing that Hitler ‘s kill was inevitable. The turkish Consul in Moscow predicted that “ the lands which the Germans have destined for their living space will become their death space ”. Britain ‘s conservative The Daily Telegraph proclaimed that the victory had saved european refinement. The state celebrated “ red Army Day ” on 23 February 1943. A ceremonial Sword of Stalingrad was forged by King George VI. After being put on public display in Britain, this was presented to Stalin by Winston Churchill at the Tehran Conference later in 1943. soviet propaganda spared no feat and wasted no time in capitalising on the gloat, impressing a global audience. The prestige of Stalin, the Soviet Union, and the global Communist bowel movement was huge, and their political position greatly enhanced .
commemoration
The Eternal Flame in Mamayev Kurgan, Volgograd, Russia ( collage ) In recognition of the determination of its defenders, Stalingrad was awarded the title Hero City in 1945. A colossal repository called The Motherland Calls was erected in 1967 on Mamayev Kurgan, the hill overlooking the city where bones and out of practice metal splinters can even be found. [ 188 ] The statue forms part of a war memorial complex which includes the ruins of the Grain Silo and Pavlov ‘s House. On 2 February 2013 Volgograd hosted a military parade and other events to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the final examination victory. [ 189 ] [ 190 ] Since then, military parades have always commemorated the victory in the city. Every year still, hundreds of bodies of soldiers who died in the battle are recovered in the sphere around Stalingrad and reburied in the cemeteries at Mamayev Kurgan or Rossoshka. [ 191 ]
In popular culture
The events of the Battle for Stalingrad have been covered in numerous media works of british, American, German, and russian origin, [ 192 ] for its significance as a turning point in the second base World War and for the loss of life associated with the battle. The term Stalingrad has become about synonymous with large-scale urban battles with eminent casualties on both sides. [ 193 ] [ 194 ] [ 195 ]
See besides
References
- ^ Some german holdouts continued to operate in the city and protest until early March 1943 .
- ^Hayward 1998, p. 195: This force grew to 1,600 in early September by withdrawing forces from the Kuban region and South Caucasus
- ^Bergström (2007)[ page needed] quotes: Soviet Reports on the effects of air raids between 23–26 August 1942. This indicates 955 people were killed and another 1,181 wounded. quotes : soviet Reports on the effects of air out raids between 23–26 August 1942. This indicates 955 people were killed and another 1,181 wounded .
- ^ 8,314 german aircraft were produced from July–December 1942, but this could not keep pace with a three-front aerial war of attrition .
- ^Shirer (1990, p. 926) says that “Paulus radioed that they would need a minimum of 750 tons of supplies day flown in,” while Craig (1973, pp. 206–207) quotes Zeitzler as pressing Goering about his boast that the Luftwaffe could airlift the needed supplies: “Are you aware … how many daily sorties the army in Stalingrad will need? … Seven hundred tons! Every day!”
Citations
bibliography
farther interpretation
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